The Context Files — Episode 2
The Boeing 737 MAX: When Safety Became a Data Problem
Episode 1: The Challenger Disaster demonstrated how critical context was known, discussed, and even documented—yet structurally prevented from influencing the final decision.
👉 Read Episode 1 here: https://www.incontextable.com/p/the-context-files-episode-1?utm_source=publication-search
The Boeing 737 MAX is the modern sequel.
Not because people stopped caring about safety—but because information systems became sophisticated enough to hide meaning from everyone involved.
Case Summary
The crashes of Lion Air Flight 610 (2018) and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 (2019) were not caused by a rogue algorithm, a careless engineer, or untrained pilots.
They were caused by a systemic information failure inside Boeing, where:
Context was compressed into classifications
Meaning was distributed across tools and teams
Responsibility was fragmented by process
And safety was reduced to compliance artifacts
Every local decision made sense.
The global outcome did not.
That is the signature of a context failure.
What Changed (The Setup)
The Market Reality
Airbus launched the A320neo with fuel-efficient engines.
Boeing faced a choice:
Design a new aircraft (slow, expensive)
Or adapt the existing 737 platform (fast, certifiable)
They chose adaptation.
That decision was rational.
It also set the context trap.
The Context Trap
The Engineering Problem
Larger engines changed the aircraft’s aerodynamics, increasing the risk of a nose-up condition at certain angles of attack.
The Software Fix
Boeing introduced MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) to:
Automatically push the nose down
Preserve handling similarity
Avoid mandatory simulator retraining
Crucially, MCAS was framed as:
A minor handling aid, not a flight-critical system.
That framing was not cosmetic.
It determined how information was allowed to mean things.
Where Context Failed
1. Classification Replaced Understanding
By labeling MCAS as “non-critical,” the system:
Escaped stricter redundancy rules
Reduced scrutiny of failure modes
Minimized pilot documentation
Safety didn’t disappear.
It was reclassified.
And once reclassified, it no longer traveled.
2. Single-Sensor Dependency Became Invisible Risk
MCAS relied on a single Angle-of-Attack sensor at a time.
From a local perspective:
Simpler
Faster to certify
Consistent with classification
From a system perspective:
A single bad input could repeatedly override pilot intent
The danger wasn’t ignored.
It was structurally unseeable.
3. Pilots Were Given Effects, Not Explanations
Pilots experienced:
Repeated nose-down trim
Conflicting alerts
No clear causal model of why the aircraft was behaving this way
They had procedures.
They lacked meaning.
This mirrors Challenger exactly:
Data existed.
Context did not survive transmission.
4. Delegated Certification Fragmented Epistemic Ownership
Regulatory authority was partially delegated back to Boeing.
The result:
Oversight focused on artifacts
Trust replaced interrogation
Assumptions traveled without their rationale
No one actor held the full model.
Everyone reviewed pieces.
No one reconstructed the whole.
The Pattern (Challenger → MAX)
Challenger737 MAXFoam strikes normalizedMCAS behavior normalizedRisk known locallyRisk classified awayEngineers raised concernsEngineers worked within constraintsDecision makers lacked contextPilots lacked context
Different era.
Same failure physics.
This Was Not a Lack of Information
The system had:
Accurate sensor data
Correct code execution
Approved procedures
Extensive documentation
Regulatory compliance
What it lacked was shared interpretation.
Boeing did not fail to collect information.
It failed to preserve meaning across boundaries.
Why This Case Belongs in the Context Files
The 737 MAX is not primarily an aviation story.
It is a modern information-system failure where:
Precision displaced understanding
Compliance displaced judgment
Artifacts displaced explanations
And context evaporated at scale
This same pattern now appears in:
Enterprise AI systems
Risk dashboards
Automated decision engines
“Single source of truth” platforms
The Core Lesson
When safety is reduced to data,
and data is divorced from context,
systems can pass every check and still fail catastrophically.
The tragedy of the 737 MAX is not that warnings were ignored.
It’s that the system made it impossible to know which warnings mattered.
Context Files Thesis (Reinforced)
Information does not fail loudly.
It fails quietly, structurally, and legally.
And by the time consequences surface, no single decision looks wrong.
That is what makes these failures repeatable.